The reality of the 'accession' instrument

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Had there been really any such document in possession of the Indian government, India would have surely used it on various international platforms to legitimize its rule over the state.

By: Aumar Aslam

India over the years has considered Kashmir as its integral part and has legitimized its rule over the region by claiming that maharaja Hari Singh, the last dogra ruler of the state signed the instrument of accession, an alleged document which India itself defends with. Few months back a similar statement was given by the Ministry Of External Affairs saying that the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir which existed before 14th of august 1947 is an integral part of India by virtue of its accession with India, which was in response to the statement given by the chief minister of gilgit-baltistan that the entire northern areas are a part of Pakistan and have no connection with Kashmir. India over the years has used the alleged instrument of accession to its greatest advantage in the United Nations and similar other platforms and justified its occupation over a Muslim majority state. But the core question is whether any such document has ever been signed by the last ruler of Jammu and Kashmir? The sequence of series of events at the time of partition does not seem to suggest so. There are three major events prior to the independence of India and Pakistan which gave birth to the long lasting dispute of Jammu and Kashmir between India and Pakistan.

1. One of the most difficult tasks for the British government in the partition of the sub-continent was the partition of Bengal and the Punjab. The former however had no impact on the future of the state of Jammu and Kashmir; the later however was to decide the fate of the dogra dynasty in the state. The process of partition of Punjab and Bengal was entrusted upon a very distinguished member of the English bar, Sir Cyril Radcliffe and was made to chair the two boundary commissions. Radcliffe arrived in New Delhi on 8th July 1947. There has been an enormous amount of controversy over the partion of Punjab by the Radcliffe commission. It is widely believed that the commission was made a scapegoat for many of the controversial decisions that the more congress friendly viceroy of India, Mountbatten made during the partition. With the main access to Kashmir, the Jhelum valley road from Rawalpindi to Srinagar falling under Pakistan, India’s only approach to the state of Jammu and Kashmir was through pathankot and two other linking tehsils in the gurdaspur district of Punjab. The Radcliffe commission appeared to depart from the basic principle of the partition by awarding these three tehsils of the Muslim majority gurdaspur district to India, thereby providing India the vital access to the state of Jammu and Kashmir, thus sowing the first seeds of the complex Kashmir problem.
2.  India long before achieving the independence had laid out its future plans for the state of Jammu and Kashmir. It was on these lines that the prime minister of Jammu and Kashmir, pandit R.C.KAK, who was thought to favour, if not accession to Pakistan but atleast an independent state of Jammu and Kashmir was removed from the office and replaced by a more pro-Indian prime minister, M.C.Mahajan. Unfortunately Kak had powerful enemies within his own pandit community. Kak got sheikh Abdullah arrested in June 1946 and turned Nehru back after a short detention from the Kashmir border who had come to help his dear friend sheikh Abdullah. These two events were the result of Kak being removed from his office a year later which again was very critical in shaping the future of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The removal of Prime Minister R.C.Kak further reinforced the Kashmir dispute.
3. Unlike the Muslims of the Kashmir valley who were considered as inert in political matters, the people of poonch were soldiers by tradition. Around June 1947 saw the beginning of the poonch revolt with Muslims refusing to pay the new taxes imposed exclusively on them. The government of Jammu and Kashmir reacted to the revolt by opening its border to Hindus, Sikhs including extremist organizations like RSS to execute the killings of Muslims in Jammu, Riasi and Mirpur districts which resulted in at least two lakh Muslims dead and forced twice as many into exile. This resulted in the direct involvement of the Azad Kashmir forces along with the pathans from the tribal area of Pakistan who came to rescue to their Muslim brothers in the valley.

As the news of the advancing Azad Kashmir forces under the command of Major Khursheed Anwar reached Srinagar, the maharaja and his advisors decided to send the deputy prime minister to New Delhi to see if he could secure any immediate help from the government of India. He was provided with personal letters from both maharaja and his prime minister, Mehr Chand Mahajan. Maharaja had also provided him with a “letter of accession to India”, which was not an unconditional instrument of accession but a letter with terms and conditions upon which a possible association between the state and the Indian dominion  might be possible in return for military aid. It seemed that the deputy prime minister Batra who arrived in New Delhi on 24th October never got round to presenting it to the Indian authorities. By the evening of 24th October, maharaja was convinced that he is losing the whole of Kashmir province and decided to move to relatively safer province of Jammu. At the same time the necessity for Kashmir to accede to India as an essential element in an offer of any direct assistance was being discussed in India. Mountbatten argued that such accession would require subsequent approval by the people of Jammu and Kashmir, without which the accession would be considered only provisional. The concept of a plebiscite was already exercised in some parts of the British India. Jawahar Lal Nehru was far from happy regarding a plebiscite and a provisional accession in case of Kashmir. Thus it was agreed that India should take some sort of direct military intervention in Kashmir although at the same time in new Delhi on 26th October a spokesman for the state department was still declaring that the government of India has no interest in whatever kind of conflict is emerging in Kashmir and it would accept with good grace if the state decides to accede to Pakistan. On 25th October, V.P.Menon, an advisor to Mountbatten and one of the most influential persons in shaping the future of India, flew to Srinagar for on the ground assessment. On the same day in the evening sheikh Abdullah left for New Delhi and stayed in Nehru’s residence. On 26th October, V.P.Menon flew back to New Delhi along with the prime minister of Jammu and Kashmir, M.C.Mahajan which resulted in a series of discussions and negotiations involving Menon, Mahajan and sheikh Abdullah with various Indian politicians including Mountbatten, Nehru and Patel.

Jammu and Kashmir’s prime minister, M.C.Mahajan had a meeting with Nehru, sheikh Abdullah along with other Indian ministers. Mahajan requested unconditional Indian military help to save Srinagar. It was clear to Mahajan that India will not agree to any military assistance without a signed instrument of accession by the maharaja. Mahajan agreed in despair that he would recommend the given conditions to the maharaja. Nehru then after consulting the defense committee decided to provide military assistance to the maharaja and asked Mahajan to set out at once for Jammu along with his advisor, V.P.Menon to inform the maharaja about the military assistance being provided by India and to obtain his signature on the instrument of accession. Through Mahajan’s memoir’s, it is clear that he refused to leave New Delhi until Indian forces had landed and secured the Srinagar airport which means he never went to Jammu on 26th October to get the papers signed by the maharaja. Though V.P.Menon maintains in his accounts that he flew to Jammu with Mahajan and back to Delhi on 26th October. It is at this point that events described diverge dramatically from the facts. Another event that supports Mhajan’s account is that V.P.Menon went to the airport to fly to Jammu in the early evening but it was considered too late for a flight to an airfield with no night landing facilities and by 5 pm he met Alexender Symon of the U.K high commission at his residence. It is now clear that on the morning of 27th October, at around 9 am when the Indian army carried by ten Dakota aircraft landed on Srinagar airport no instrument of accession was signed by the maharaja. Had there been really any such document in possession of the Indian government, India would have surely used it on various international platforms to legitimize its rule over the state.

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